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In the absence of monetary superneutrality, inflation affects capital accumul-
ation and the demand for real balances. This paper derives the combination of
monetary and lump—sum fiscal policy which maximizes the sum of discounted util-
ities of representative consumers in present and future generations. Under the
optimal policy package, the steady state has a zero nominal interest rate and
has monetary contraction at the rate of intergenerational discount. As the rate
of intergenerational discount rate approaches zero, optimal policy maximizes
steady state utility of the representative consumer. In this case, the optimal
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This paper re—examines the implications of finite hfetimes for optimal monetary and fiscal
policy. It is well—known from Sidreuski (1 967) that if consumers have infinite horizons, then
money is superneutrel) Under superneutrality, the steady state capital stock is independent of
the rate of monetary growth, and the optimal rate of monetary growth is that rate which leads
consumers to hold the satiation level of reel balances as suggested by Friedman (1 969). By
contrast, if selfish consumers have finite lives, then, as suggested by Tobin (1 980, p.90) in his
discussion of Wallace (1 980), and as demonstrated more formally by Weiss (1 980) and Drazen
(1 981 ), superneutrality does not hold. In the absence of superneutrality , the consideration of
optimal monetary growth must take account of the effects of inflation on capital accumulation as
well as on the demand for reel balances.
Using the utility of the representative consumer in the steady state as the criterion for
evoiuatin9 policy, both Summers (1 981) and Weiss (1 980) conclude that the optimal net rate
of nominal monetary growth is positive. Summers reaches this conclusion by using U. S. data to
calibrate certain parameters of a monetary growth model in which savings is not determined by
utility mcirnization, but rather is specified to be proportional to disposable income as in Tobin
(1 965). Weiss's conclusion is a theoretical proposition based on an overlapping generations
model with money in the utility function. In addition, Weiss points out that optimal monetary
policy will not satisfy Friecknen's prescription that the satiation level of real balances be held,
or equivalently, that the nominal interest rate be equal to zero in the steady state. However,
Weiss's conclusions about optimal monetary policy are based on an analysis of second- best
policy. In general, two independent policy instruments are required to allow the competitive
economy to reach the first—best optimum. I will demonstrate in this paper that the policy
package which allows the competitive economy to mcimize the utility of the representative
consumer in the steady state is characterized by a constant nominal money supply and a zero
nominal interest rate. These results differ from Weiss's results because, (a) consistent with
2Friedman (1 969), I specify the existence of a satiation level of real balances and (b) I
determine first-best rather than second—best policy. This characterization of optimal policy
applies whether money creation takes place via lump—sum government transfers or as a result
of monetizing the fiscal deficit.
Section I presents a model of a deterministic competitive economy with money end captel.
The analysis of optimal policy requires some criterion function to evaluate the outcome of
policy. Section II presents the criterion function introduced by Sarnuelson (1 967,1 968) and
then develops a justification for this criterion function based on individual utility maximization.
In a limiting case, maximization of this criterion function is equivalent to maximization of the
utility of the representative consumer in the steady state. Section III presents the policy
package which maximizes the policy criterion function in the steady state. Steady state utility of
the representative consumer is maximized by a constant nominal money stock and a fiscal pohcy
that supports a zero nominal interest rate. More generally, if the policy criterion function
discounts the utility of future generations, then the optimal steady state is still characterized by
a zero nominal interest rate, but has a constant (negative) growth rate of nominal money
balances rather than a constant level of nominal balances. The optimal policy in section III is
derived under the asumption that money creation is effected through lump-sum transfers. In
section IV, I model money creation as arising from the financing of fiscal deficits and
demonstrate that the optimal policy in the steady state is virtually the same as with monetary
transfers as in section III.
I. The Competitive Economg
The model analyzed in this section follows Weiss (1 980) with minor modification so the
description will be brief. Let Nt be the number of consumers born at the beginning of period t.
Each consumer lives for two periods and inelastically supplies one unit of labor when young. Old
consumers do not work. The aggregate production function is linearly homogeneous in capital Kt
3and labor Nt, and the production function can be written in intensive form as
= f(kt) > 0, f" < 0 (1)
where t is the output/labor ratio and kt Kt/Nt is the capital/labor ratio.
The homogeneous output can be consumed or used as capital in the following period. In
competitive factor marketsthe (gross) interest rate, P, end the wage rate, wt, are equal to the
marginal products of capital end labor, respectively,
= P(k) 1 + f(kt) (2)
wt = w(kt) f(k) — ktf '(kt) ()
There are two assets in the economy. In addition to capital, there is fiat money. Let Mt be the
nominal aggregate stock of fiat money outstanding at the beginning of period t and let Ht be the
nominal aggregate amount of (lump—sum) monetary transfers (i.e., new money) given to old
consumers immediately after the beginning of period t. Thus the evolution of nominal aggregate
rnoneij balances is given by
Mt+i = Mt + Ht t+i1lt
In (4) 1 is defined as the gross growth rate of the nominal aggregate stock of fiat money
during period t. Letting t denote the money price of goods, define the reel stock of fiat money
and the real value of monetary transfers, each deflated by the number of young consumers as
M/(pN) (5)
H1/(pN) (6)
Let iY.1 i /p be defined as the gross rate of inflation. In the steady state with a
constant rate of monetary growth, t, end with constant reel balances per capita, the rate of
inflation is constant
If = pIG (7)
where 6 Nt/Nt_i is the gross rate of population growth.
Let ct denote the consumption of a young consumer in period t and let denote the
4consumption of en old consumer in period t. A representative consumer born in period tobtains
utility from consumption when young, Ct, consumption when old, xt+ 1 and the reel stock of
monetjheholdsattheendofperiodt. Sinceell moneijsheldbyyoungconsumersattheendof
each period, the value of real balances held by a representative consumer at heend of period t is
1 /(p1N1) = 6lft+ 1 The utility of a representative consumer is
U1 = U(c1, x1+1 , G11m11) (8)
where U( , , ) is strictly concave and is strictly increasing in ct x1 i• In addition,
supposethatciandxt+i areeechnorrnalgoodsandthatforeechct,xt+i >Othereexistsa
satiation level of real balances m* such that OtJ(ct, xt+ 1 6'Tt+ i m*)/ôrn = 0. The existence of
a satiation level of reel balances is an important element of Frieónans optimal quantity of
monetj.
Finally, suppose that there is a balanced—budget pay-as-you-go lump-sum tax and transfer
system which, in period t, taxes each young consumer and gives each oldconsumer a subsidy
ofG.
It is convenient to define St as the saving of a consumer born at the beginning of period t
St = wt--ct ()
Recalling that at the end of period t the consumer holds real balances of 6TY 1 mt+ 1 it is clear
that the consumers holding of capital is equal to St — 6t+ 1 mt+ . In period t+ 1 , when the
consumer is old, his resources available for consumption are equal to the sum of his gross
capital income
— GiT. 1 mt+ 1 JRt+ 1 ) his money balances carried over from the previous
period (Grnt+ 1 ) the monetary transfer he receives t+ ), and the fiscal transfer he
receives (6t 1 ). so that
= (St - &nt+irni+i)Rt+i + (m11 + h11 + tt+i)G (10)
Using the definition of saving in (9), equation (10) can be used to derive the lifetime budget
constraint
5t+ict + xt+1 +
- 1)Gmt+i = Rt+i(wt- tt) + 6(ht+i + (11)
Note that t+ 1 t+ i — 1 is the net nominal interest rate , and then observe that the left hand
side of (11) is the future value of expenditures on consumption when young, consumption when
old, and the rental of reel balances. The right hand side of (11) is the future value of lifetime
income net of taxes.
The first-order conditions for the consumer's optimization problem are easily obtained by
using (9) and (10) to substitute for Ct end xt+ 1 in the utility function (8) and then
differentiating with respect to St and mt+ 1 Evaluating these conditions in the steady state and
using (7) to substitute for steady state inflation yields
= RU< (12)
Iii(R/G) 111x = (I1/G)Um (13)
where ô1J( )/ôc, U '( )mx, 1m ii( )/o(&rrm) in the steady state.
To interpret (1 2) note that a young consumer who chooses to hold an additional unit of capital
by foregoinga unit of consumption suffers a utility loss of U from the reduction in consumption
when young. However, his consumption when old is increased by R units which raises utility by
RUx. An optimizing consumer will invest to the point where the utility lossU equals the utility
gem RU<. To interpret (1 3), use the expression for the steady state rate of inflation in (7) to
obtain Urn = (R - 1 /ir)U. A consumer who rearranges his portfolio by reckicing hisholding of
capital by one unit and increasing his holding of real balances by one unit loses (P - 1 /lr) units
of second period consumption which induces a utility loss of (R - 1 uiøU. The optimizing
consumer equates this utility loss with the utility gain Urn from holding an additional unit of
real balances.
Finally, observe that the optimal saving of a consumer, St' can be written as
St = s(wt — it, 6Eh +t+1J' t+i R1 ) (1'1)
Theassump1ionthetcandx1 arenormelgoodsimpliesthat0<s1 <1 and-1/R ' S2 =
6—(1-si)/Rt+i < Owheres1 istheparti&denvativeofs( , , , )withrespecttoitnth
argument. In &kiition, tt follows that dst/dtt + 't't+ 1 <o so that a permanent increase in
the fiscal transfer from young consumers to old consumers leads to a reduction in individual
saving
IL The Pohcqmakers Objective Function
The competitive monetary growth model in section i is essentially identical to that in Weiss
(1 g80). Weiss then used this model to examine the effects of policy on the utility of the
rsoresentative consumer in the steady state. In this section I adopt a more general criterion
function for policy evaluation. In particular, follow Samuelson (1 967,1 968) and assume that
in period t the policyrneker attempts to maximize
Wt = (1-a) aiu+ (15)j=-l
subject to the aggregate resource constraint
C1 + x/G = f(kt) + k1 - Okt+i (16)
and the constraint that 1 fixed by history. As pointed out by Calvo and Obstfeld (1 985),
the utility of old consumers, Ut_ 1' must be included in the period t criterion function to avoid
clynemic inconsistency.2
The criterion function in (1 5) may strike some readers as 1h There are two answers
that may be offered to such an objection. First, if one is willing to use Weisss criterion
function........rnaxirnizing the utility of a representative consumer in the steady sthte.._then one
metj merely set equal to one in the discussion of optimal policy in sections III and IV.
Formally, the Sarnuelson welfare function approaches the criterion function used by Weiss as
-1.
A second justification for (1 5) involves an alternative specification of the individual utility
function which leads to optimal decision rules for an individual consumer which are identical to
7those derived in section I. Specifically, let V1 be the utility of an individualgeneration t
consumer and let be the average utility of the entire cohort of generation t consumers. Now
suppose that an individual generation t consumer cares about the average level of utility of the
entire generation t cohort and the average level of utility of the entire generation 1+ 1 cohort, in
addition to his own consumption and real money balances es in (8). tn particular, let the utility
function of a generation t consumer be
Vt = Ut + aV + (17)
wherea>O, 'p0, a+'y< 1 andUisgivenby(8). ProvidedthatNtislarge,thedecision
rules for en individual which meximize (1 7) will be identical to those which meximize (8).
Thus, the behavior of a competitive economy with meximizing consumers will be unchanged if
the individual utility function (8) is replaced by (1 7).
To obtain en expression for average utility in terms of the streams of consumption and real
money balances, calculate the average value (over generation t consumers) of both sides of
(17),
(1-u) = + (18)
where is the average value of U. Equation (18) is a linear first-order constant coefficient
difference equation. The non-explosive solution to the equation can be written eesily by defining
p /(1-o) andobservingthet 0< < 1. Withthisdefinitionobservethat
= (1-ui'iQ+ (19)j=0
Finally, obvi e that Y4... = (1-UY'Wt where_1 is the average utility of oldconsumers
at time t aid Wt is the policy criterion function in period t es shown in (1 5). Thus, in the
steaj state, reeximization of Y is equivalent to mcimization of the Sernuelsonien criterion
function in (15).

9marginal cost of producing money is zero.
B. Optimal Police
In this sectrnn present the combination of monetary and fiscal policies which aflows the
competitive economy to achieve the soci& optimum in the steady state. This strategy is different
from that pursued by Weiss (1 980). Weiss essentially restricted his analysis to a second— best
framework by assuming that the policy authority can "control only the size of the nominal
transfer to each old person. Particularly, the authority is denied the possibility of acquiring
real capital." (p. 568). In the optimal policy package presented below, the policy authority
will, as in Weiss, be prevented from acquiring real capital. However, the policy authority will
have two instruments: the gross rate of nominal monetary growth, p. and the size of the
balanced- budget peg- as- you- go intergenerational transfer i.'
The optimal policy package in the steady state is
= p (21a)
c such that pm* + Gk = s(w(k*) - t, G((- 1 )m*411 , p/6, G/p) (21b)
where k* is the Modified Golden Rule capital stock and m* is the satiation level of real balances.
Equation (21a) implies that (using (7)) the steady stategross rate of inflation is i = /6 so
that the steady state gross real (pecuniary) rate of return on money is 6/u. Equation (21 b)
states that when the real rates of return on money end capital are each equal to G/ the Modified
Golden Rule capital stock and the satiation level of real balances will be willingly held by
consumers when is optimally chosen. To see that there ecists a unique optimal (which may
of course be negative) recall that the normality of c and x implies that if k, m, and p are given,
then ds/di = de/dt + dst/dt 1 •4 Finally, recall that the gross nominal interest rate is
equal to the product of the gross reel rate of return, R, and the gross rate of inflation, if. In the
optimal steady state, P = G/ and ii' = /G so that the gross nominal interest rate is equal to one
10
and the net nominal interest rate is equal to zero.
Having presented the policy package which allows the competitive economy to achieve the
social optimum, several remarks are in order:
(1) The prescription for optimal monetary growth, t = , is independent of the production
function and is independent of the particular specification of the individual utility function.
However, the optimal fiscal transfer depends on both individual preferences and the production
function, in general.
(2) The result that the optimal gross rate of monetary growth is equal to is the same as in
two other capitalistic monetary models with money in the utility function. Dornbusch and
Frenkel (1 973) have shown that i = is optimal in the Sidrauski model where is the discount
factor in the utility function of the representative infinitely-lived consumer. Also McCallum
(1 983) has shown that in an overlapping generations model with money in the utility function
and a fixed rate of return on capital (rather than a neoclassical production function), the
optimal rate of monetary growth is . The prescription that ,t = is also obtained for endowment
economies by Brock (1 975) and Townsend (1 980).
(3) If money is not in the utility function, then the first—best social optimum is described
by the Atemporal Allocation condition (20a) and the Intertemporal Allocation condition (20b).
In this case, the optimal steady state policy package is simply j, = . Fiscal policy — more
specifically the choice of — is irrelevant in the steady state, provided that aggregate saving is
large enough to absorb the Modified Golden Rule capital stock and some positive level of real
balances. However, if aggregate saving is smaller than or equal to the Modified Golden Rule
capitaistock (i.e.,if Gk* s( ,,, )),thenedecreaseintisrequiredtoraiseaggregatesaving
so that the Modified Golden Rule capital stock and some real balances will be willingly held in
private portfolios. The applicability of the results in this remark to monetary policy must be
judged in light of McCallums (1 983) argument that, in this case, Mt is only a store of value,
11
and if Mt is only a store of value then it is not appropriate to interpret Mt as money.
(4) If = 1 , so that the objective of the policy authority is to maximize steady state
individual utility (8), as in Weiss (1 980), then the optimal policy package calls for a constant
nominal money supply and a level of t which leads toe zero nominal interest rate in the long
run.5 Why do these results differ from Weis&s finding that "the maximum sustainable utility
level will require positive growth in the money supply" (p. 566) and that Friedmens "full
liquidity" rule does not hold in the presence of consumers with finite lives? The sources of the
difference are: (1) in his analysis of policy, Weiss assumes that the marginal utility of money,
Urn, is everywhere positive, which implies that the real rate of return on capital must exceed
the (pecuniary) real rate of return on money; and (2) Weiss restricts his analysis to
second- best policy. Under the assumption that Urn is everywhere positive, it should not be
surprising that the Friecknen rule (zero nominal interest rate) is not the optimal policy; it is
not even a feasible policyl If is specified Urn is specified to be strictly decreasing in the level of
reel balances, end to become zero at some level of real balances, so that the Frie&nan rule is
feasible, then as shown above, the Frie&nan full liquidity rule is part of a first-best optimal
policy package. Even if I do not assume that the policy authority has a value of equal to one, but
alternatively has a value of less than one, the first- best optimal policy package is to set p =
and to choose t to peg a zero nominal interest rate in the steady state.
IV. The Government's Budget Constraint
In previous sections of the paper I igeored the link between the governments fiscal deficit
and money creation. I modeled the tax and transfer system as being run by a fiscal authority that
is constrained to run a balanced budget in every period. The monetary authority increases the
nominal supply of money simply by giving the money to people as if dropping it from a
helicopter (Frie&nan (1 969), p. 4). The first best optimal policy package requires a reduction
in aggregate nominal balances, and to implement this reduction "we substitute a furnace for the
12
helicopter" (Friedman (1 969), p. 1 6). The use of the helicopter and the furnace, rather than
government transactions in goods markets end/or assets markets, to change the nominal money
supply has a long tradition in monetary economics and monetary growth models in particular
(For example, Friedman (1 969), McCallum (1983) endSidreuski (1967)). Nevertheless,
because the helicopter (and furnace) abstraction does not capture the /dproq.'o nature of an
open market purchase or of monetization of a dot icit, the interpretation of monetary policy is
somewhat strained. The previous section of this paper used the helicopter (and furnace)
abstraction in order to be directly comparable to the large and well- known literature that uses
this abstraction. In this section, however, I dispense with the helicopter and furnace, end model
the government's budget constraint.
The government's budget constraint requires that the rate of creation of claims against the
government is equal to the fiscal deficit. I will maintain the assumption that the government
does not participate in the capital market so that the rate of creation of nominal moneg balances
is equal to the nominal fiscal deficit. In order to allow for a nonzero deficit I relax the
assumption that the aggregate transfers to the old are equal to the taxes levied on the young. Let
be the reel lump-sum transfer received by each old consumer in period t and, as before, let
be the real lump-sum tax levied on each young consumer in period t. Recalling that Il is the
creation of aggregate nominal balances in period t, the governments budget constraint is
= pt(Nt_izt - Nt1J (22)
Using the definition of reel per capita money creation in (6), the government's budget
constraint in real per capita terms can be rewritten as
= zt/G - (23)
In this modified environment, the budget constraint of an indivijal consumer differs from
that in (11). An old consumer in period t+ 1 has available his gross capital income, his real
balances and the fiscal subsidy so that
13
t+i = 1st — Gllt+imt+iJRt+i + t+i + zti. (24)
Usmg the definition of saving in (9), equation (24) can be rearranged to obtain the lifetime
budget constraint
+ xt+1 +
- 1)6m41 = Rt+i(wt—tt) + (25)
The budget constraint in (25) is identical to the budget constraint in (11) except that2t+
rather than G(ht+ 1 + t+ i ) is the second-period non-portfolio income on the right hand side.
The optimal saving of a young generation t consumer is given by
St = s(wt—tt, zt+i,nt+i,Rt+i) (26)
where the function s( ,,, ) is identical to that in (1 4) except that the second argument, which
represents net lump-sum transfers received in the second period, is 2t+ 1 rather than G(ht+ 1
+
I can now examine opt irn& monetary and fiscal policy in this modified economy taking account
of the governments budget constraint. The socially optimal allocation in the steecj state is still
described by the Atemporel Allocation Condition, the Interternporal Allocation Condition, and the
Optimal Quantity of Money Condition (20a, b, c). The optimal steady state is characterized by
the Modified Golden Rule level of capital intensity, k*, such that R(k*) = G/ and by the optimal
level of real balances m*. The optimal (gross) rate of monetary growth is equal to and the
fiscal tex- transfer stjstern must be such that desired savings is exactly large enough to absorb
the Modified 6olden Rule capital stock and the Optimal Quantity of Money
+ Gk* = s(w(k*) — t, z, /G, 6/a) (27)
The level of fiscal transfers to old consumers in the steady state can be calculated from the
governmenVs budget constraint (23) using the stej state relation h = (it— I )m to obtain
z = G((p-1)m + (28)
Using (28) to substitute for z in (27), and recalling that optimal policy calls for i = , yields
+ Gk = s(w(k*) - t, G1(— 1 )m + ti, /6, G/) (29)
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Note that (29) s x1entc& to (21 b) so that in the presence of the government's budget
constraint optimal monelary and fiscal policy in the steady state are given by (21 a,b). The only
difference is that when it is recognized that the rate of money creation is identical to the nominal
fiscal deficit, the optimal lump—sum fiscal transfer to old consumers is 61 (P- I )m* + ti
rather than simply (5t, as in section III - In either formulation, each old consumer receives a
total transfer of (31 (- 1 )m* + ti. Using the helicopter/furnace abstraction, this transfer
consists of a monetary transfer of G(p- 1 )m and a fiscal transfer of Ge. Alternatively, if I rule
out monetary transfers and specify money creation to be equal to the fiscal deficit, then the
entire transfer to old consumers GE (- 1 )m + tJ is a fiscal transfer. In this case if < 1,
then the optimal policy requires monetary contraction, which implies that the fiscal authority
should run a surplus in the steady state.
In the stylized model of this paper, the distinction between lump-sum monetary transfers
and lump—sum fiscal transfers is somewhat artificial. The formulation of the government's
budget constraint in this section captures the v,Wproqw nature of the transactions by which
money is injected or withdrawn from the economy. However, have shown that the
prescription for optimal policy is essentially the same whether money creation is effected
through transfers or the financing of fiscal deficits.
V. Concluding Remarks
In this paper I have analyzed optimal monetary and fiscal policy in a competitive economy
populated by overlapping generations of finitely— lived consumers who obtain utility from real
balances. I have shown that maximum sustainable utility requires a constant nominal money
supply and that lump-sum balanced—budget fiscal transfers must beset ealevel that induces
consumers to be satiated with real balances. Thus, optimal policy will lead to a zero nominal
interest rate. More generally, maximization of a weighted average of utility of all future
15
generations requires contraction of the nominal money supply at the rate at which the utility of
one generation is discounted relative the utility of the previous generation. However, even with
this more general criterion function, the Friedman full liquidity rule remains part of the
first-best optimal policy package. This characterization of the optimal policy package holds
regardless of whether money creation occurs via lump-sum transfers to consumers or occurs as
the means of financing fiscal deficits.
Some readers will undoubtedly object to the presence of money in the utility function.6 If
such readers are willing to analyze policy in an economy in which Mt is purely a store of value,
despite McC&lums argument about the need to model the transactions services of money, they
may apply the results of this paper and set Urn 0. The Optimal policy package in this case will
require only one instrument end indeed is quite simple. set the rate of nominal monetary growth
equal to . Therefore, steady state utility of the representative consumer is maximized by a
constant nominal money supply.
A second response to readers who object to putting money into the utility function is first to
point out that this formulation is intended to be a short-hand way of modelling the transactions
services of money but then to acknowledge that a more satisfactory modelling strategy would aim
at modelling the transactions services more directly, perhaps by including leisure in the utility
function. Indeed, I think that a useful extension of the research in this paper would be to analyze
monetary and fiscal policy in a model with a more complete specification of transactions
services.
The result that the optimal rate of monetary growth is equal to is quite robust along several
dimesions. It does not depend on the particular specificietion of technology or preferences; it
does not even depend on whether money is in the utility function. However, this result must be
modified in the presence of uncertainty. An analysis of optimal policy in the presence of
uncertainty appears to be an important topic for future research.
16
Footnotes
1. In a recent paper, Well (1 986) shows that if there isa continual influx of infinitely—lived
new consumers into an economy, and if these consumers do not receive transfers from existing
consumers, then the economy will not display superneutrality of money even though all
consumers have infinite horizons.
2. If the utility of old consumers, , were not included in the period Icriterion function,
then the social planner would set xt = 0, despite the fact that in period 1- 1 the social planner
had optimally planned for xt to be positive.
3. See Calvo (1978) for an analysis of the case in which the government cannot levy lump-sum
taxes but can levy distort lonary taxes.
4. I follow Diamond (1 965) and assume that preferences and technology are such that for given
tandiL there isaunique steady state.
5. Wallace (1 985) describes a policy package which allows en endowment economy with
perfectly perishable endowments to maximize steady state utility of the representative
consumer. Consistent with the results presented above, the optimal policy package has a
constant stock of nominal fiat money (ti= = 1) and a zero nominal interest rate.
6. See Kei-eken and Wallace (1980), Bryant (1983) and Wallace (1983).
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